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This thesis examines how and why a developing nation may use its civilian
space program to acquire ballistic missiles. Using a single case study of Brazil,
this analysis looks for universal patterns in space program development and
for how Third World nations use their civilian space programs for military
purposes. This thesis analyzes the relationship between space and missile
development, the Missile Technology Control Regime, reasons for building
missiles (political, economic, national security, geopolitical, need for
technology), Brazilian civil-military relations, and various technologies and
space systems. It identifies the critical technologies required for a successful
space program; identifies the critical industries that are missing in Brazil and
the technologies that it must import; highlights indicators of military intentions
of a civilian space program; and evaluates how the generalizations developed
throughout the thesis may be applied to other nations.
m
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The issue of ballistic missile proliferation was given a new sense of urgency
due to Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Of particular importance to the allies
was the disposition of Iraq's Scud ballistic missiles and its weapons of mass
destruction.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the case of a developing nation
(Brazil) that has active space and missile programs. The intent is to form
generalizations based on this case study which can be applied to other
developing nations in order to evaluate the progress and military potential
of their space programs. This thesis addresses the following questions:
(1) What are the critical technologies, facilities, and processes required for a
successful space program?
(2) What technologies must be imported and which can be indigenously
produced? What critical industries are typically absent in Third World
nations which inhibit progress in space?
(3) What indicators would be present to show military intentions and at
what point would a military divergence take place?
(4) Based on this case study, can generalizations be formed that reliably
predict the military potential of another developing nation's space
program?
IV
This thesis examines how and why a developing nation may use its civilian
space program to acquire ballistic missiles. Using a single case study of Brazil,
this analysis looks for universal patterns in space program development and
for how Third World nations use their civilian space programs for military
purposes. This thesis analyzes the relationship between space and missile
development, the Missile Technology Control Regime, reasons for building
missiles (political, economic, national security, geopolitical, need for
technology), Brazilian civil-military relations, and various technologies and
space systems. It identifies the critical technologies required for a successful
space program; identifies the critical industries that are missing in Brazil and
the technologies that it must import; highlights indicators of military intentions
of a civilian space program; and evaluates how the generalizations developed
throughout the thesis may be applied to other nations.
It concludes that:
(1) The critical technologies that Brazil needs include liquid fuel engine and
TVC technologies. Solid fuel technology is applicable in some capacity for
orbiting satellites, but liquid engines are needed to economically compete in
the space launch market. Solid fuel missiles are easier to hide, transport, and
fire than are liquid fuel systems like the Scud. These advantages make Brazil's
solid fuel technology attractive to customers seeking ballistic missiles.
Additional technologies that are vital to both liquid and solid fuel systems
include composite materials for heat shielding and reentry vehicles,
pyrotechnics for stage separation, heat treatment capability to strengthen motor
casings, and computer technology to help design engineers and assist in on-
board guidance.
(2) The lack of a sophisticated computer industry combined with restricted
access to First World computer technology is one of the biggest inhibitors to
progress in Brazil.
(3) Indicators of military intentions for a civilian space program include the
strong presence of the military in both the space and missile programs, and its
ongoing influence on the government.
(4) Brazil has determined to continue with its space and missile programs.
A poor domestic economy combined with a resurgent demand for missiles
may leave Brazil little choice but to build and sell missiles to keep its space
program viable and to keep a positive trade balance. However, Brazil may
conform to MTCR guidelines in order to modernize its VLS system and
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND/ PURPOSE OF THESIS
The issue of ballistic missile proliferation was given a
new sense of urgency due to Desert Storm and Desert Shield.
As the allied coalition assembled for battle against the
forces of Saddam Hussein, they faced the stark reality that
the weapons opposing them were their own. Of particular
importance to the allies was the disposition of Iraq's Scud
ballistic missiles and its weapons of mass destruction.
Fortunately for the allied coalition, Iraq did not have, or
did not use, atomic weapons, and did not use the chemical
weapons it possessed. But as Scud missiles flew towards
Riyadh, Dhahran, and Tel Aviv, one could not help but wonder
if the ballistic missile genie was out of the bottle.
In the months before and after Desert Storm, the news
media focussed on the debate surrounding the issue of
ballistic missiles in the Third World. Part of the debate
was centered on how a developing nation could have an active
space program and how it could hide ballistic missile
capability. This is an extremely important question which
is at the very heart of the intelligence problem. It is
important, therefore, to understand why developing nations
want space and missile capabilities and how they are
achieving their goals.
Ballistic missile proliferation commands the attention
of the world's leaders. In 1982, then-president Ronald
Reagan ordered the beginning of negotiations which brought
about the 1987 signing of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) . In 1991, president Bush put into effect the
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, which is designed
to further reduce the flow of missile systems and technology
to the Third World. In mid-1991, representatives of the
United Nations Security Council were discussing measures to
curb ballistic missile proliferation.
According to Dr. Janne Nolan of the Brookings Institute,
there are three principal methods by which developing
nations acquire ballistic missiles. They are:
(1) Modifying space-launch vehicles to create ballistic
missiles
.
(2) Producing missile prototypes in national defense
industries
.
(3) Acquiring foreign missile systems, components, and
technical assistance.
(Nolan, 1991, p. 39)
The first method is the most difficult to detect and
analyze. Many of the technologies that go into space launch
vehicles are identical to those involved in ballistic
missiles. Legitimate national goals of exploiting space for
peaceful purposes can cover covert missile production,
whereas the second and third methods mentioned above are
2
more traditional intelligence problems. It is relatively
easy to observe defense industries and notice shifts in
product lines or anomalies in supplies, facilities,
operations, etc. Likewise, tracking known missile systems
can be accomplished through traditional intelligence
methods. The more difficult intelligence problem is trying
to discern the intentions and capabilities of a nation that
is pursuing ballistic missile production under the cover of
a civilian space program.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the case of a
developing nation (Brazil) that has active space and missile
programs. The intent is to form generalizations based on
this case study which can be applied to other developing
nations in order to evaluate the progress and military
potential of their space programs. This thesis will attempt
to answer the following questions:
(1) What are the critical technologies, facilities, and
processes required for a successful space program?
(2) What technologies must be imported and which can be
indigenously produced? What critical industries are
typically absent in Third World nations which
inhibit progress in space?
(3) What indicators would be present to show military
intentions and at what point would a military
divergence take place?
(4) Based on this case study, can generalizations be
formed that reliably predict the military potential
of another developing nation's space program?
B . METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses a single case study method. The
advantage of the single case study is greater depth and
analysis of the thesis questions as they pertain to the
subject. The main disadvantage is that the ability to make
generalizations is limited, owing to the dearth of
comparative examples. In this thesis, the choice of the
single case study method is sound due to the nature of the
subject. Brazil is suitable for this approach for the
following reasons:
(1) Brazil has an open press, a market economy, and a
fairly open society, all of which facilitate the flow of
information. This includes information about space and
missile projects. Many developing nations have
authoritarian regimes that inhibit openness, thereby
limiting the availability and reliability of data.
(2) Brazil is on the leading edge of the Third World, or
the trailing edge of the First World. Brazil is sometimes
seen as a bridge between the First and Third Worlds. The
paths that Brazil chooses may influence other developing
nations. Brazil's success in space-related ventures is
closely watched by many nations, especially those interested
in breaking down First World technological "cartels."
(3) Brazil has a growing industrial base. Its
industrial policies and current economic condition is in
many ways representative of other developing nations, and
can therefore be the basis of generalizations.
This thesis will follow the pattern in Figure 1:























































Figure 1: Thesis Design
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one
examines the process of space development and the issues of
missiles in the Third World. It looks for macro patterns in
space development and micro patterns in the reasoning behind
Third World missile issues.
Part two examines space technologies, systems,
fundamentals, and facilities involved in Brazil's space
program. It searches for the level of development in
Brazil's space program and identifies some of the inhibitors
to Brazil's progress.
The patterns developed in part one and the level of
progress derived from part two should create generalizations
that may be applied to the original thesis questions.
PART I
Part one is comprised of chapters II and III. The
intent of part one is to introduce the reader to non-
technical issues surrounding Brazil's space and missile
programs. Chapter II will show a reversal of space usage
patterns between First World and Third World nations,
specifically from military-civilian to civilian-military
progress. Chapter III will examine some of the reasons for
developing nations' desire for missiles, and U.S. reactions.
Also, Brazilian civil-military relations will be studied and
will show a pattern of military involvement in the space
program from the genesis of the space program until today.
The activities of General Hugo Olivera Piva are used as one
example of this involvement.
II. PATTERNS OF SPACE DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will introduce the reader to the process in
which space and missile programs have traditionally begun
and demonstrate a new pattern of development that emerging
nations are exhibiting in their pursuit of space and missile
technology. Brazil's space program typifies this new
pattern and is paralleled by the Indian program. A brief
discussion of how Germany, the United States, and the Soviet
Union began their space programs will establish the First
World baseline of military-to-civilian applications in
space. The European/Japanese programs will show a shift to
exclusively civilian applications in space, while an
examination of India's program will show a shift towards
civilian-to-military applications in space. The changing
models in the use of space and Brazil's adherence to the
last pattern will become evident throughout the chapter.
B. MILITARY-CIVILIAN MODEL
There is a near reversal in the pattern of space
industry growth in the past 40 years. Whereas Germany, the
United States, and the Soviet Union pursued space for
military purposes and then branched into civilian
applications, the European community, Japan, and various
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developing nations are pursuing civilian space programs
before aspiring to achieve military capabilities.
The process in which nations have pursued space and
missile programs has changed through the years and has done
so relative to the nations' economic and technological
infrastructure. Although space and rocket research had been
going on since the 1920 's with Dr. Robert Goddard's
experiments, practical applications in rocketry were not
realized until World War II with the advent of the German V-
2. After World War II, both the United States and Soviet
Union captured many German scientists and put them to work
building weapons for their respective countries. The goal
of both regimes was to build systems to deliver weapons,
especially nuclear weapons, over long distances. The
missile programs were kept in the realm of the military for
the duration of the 1940 's and most of the 1950 's. In the
United States the Scout rocket was transferred to NASA in
May 1958. While the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957
alarmed the American public because it seemed to signal that
the Soviets were ahead in space technology, the U.S. Air
Force had already begun robust ICBM and satellite programs.
The ballistic missile programs had begun in the late 1940'
s
after the observation of German V-2 success. The satellite
program was started in 1954 with a RAND report which urged
that a satellite reconnaissance program be undertaken as





The Thor program began in 1955 as an Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) . It was later adopted as a booster
for space exploration. (Hazard, 1977, p. 5-49) Likewise, the
Soviet Union began its space program with the intention of
developing ballistic missiles and eventually satellite
capability. It then turned towards "civilian" applications.
C. CIVILIAN-CIVILIAN MODEL
In more recent times, the European community and Japan
have entered strictly commercial phases of space
applications. Both are developing launchers and payloads
that have commercial uses, such as communications
satellites, imaging (eg: SPOT), and remote sensing
satellites for scientific purposes. While there is
potential for military uses for these technologies, there
are public prohibitions to those uses. The Japanese
constitution allows its armed forces to be used for
defensive purposes only and renounces other than peaceful
uses of nuclear power. In Europe, there is a strong Green
movement that opposes nuclear weapons and missiles, and the
many small countries that comprise the European Space Agency
(ESA) are not inclined to expend resources for ballistic
missile programs. As well, there may be a reluctance among
10
European nuclear pov/ers (France and Britain tc share t
nuclear and missile technologies with their neighbors.
D. CIVILIAN-MILITARY MODEL
There appears to he a slightly different pattern
emerging in the Third '.'."'.rid. Several developing nations are
pursuing space programs under the pretext of exploiting the
commercial uses of space and modernizing their industrial
infrastructure to support contemporary applications- azil
and India are tv/o such cases and their programs are causing
concern due to the close ties between their civilian
military space programs.
1. India
India established the National Committee for Space
Pesearch in 1962. It v/as a part of India's Department of
Atomic Energy. In 1969 the Indian Space Resea
Organization v/as established to direct sounding-rocket
experiments and in 1972, the cabinet-level Department of
Space v/as created. The purpose of the Department of Si
v/as "the transition of the space effort from a scier.ci:.\
undertaking of limited magnitude to a coordir.at ed program
with specific goals and time-bound projects in space
applications and technology." (Nolan, 1991,0.41, In 1983,
the 21-year-old Defer.se Pesearch and Development
Organization (whose mission is to oversee defer.se
11
investment) was explicitly linked to the space sector when
missile production became a priority. (Nolan, 1991, p. 41)
India gained a great deal of its space-related
knowledge through cooperative efforts with the Soviet Union.
They began working on sounding rockets in the 1960 's and
satellite launch vehicles a few years later. The Soviets,
typically conservative about controlling access to advanced
military technology, offered an unusually high degree of
assistance to India. In 1971 the Soviet Union and India
agreed to jointly develop a satellite that was successfully
launched in 1975. The Aryabhata (1975) and the Bhaskara
(1979) were primarily made in India and launched from Soviet
facilities. During the joint projects, the Soviets provided
Indian scientist with ample expertise to build their own
solid-fuel rocket by late 1979. (Nolan, 1991, p. 42)
India had been working on an indigenously designed
an advance space launch vehicle (ASLV) , specifically the
SLV-3, since 1968. It launched the Rhoni satellite into
near-earth orbit in mid-1980. A follow-on to the SLV-3, the
SLV-4 was tested in 1986 and in 1989. Indian officials
announced that the first stage of the PSLV had been
successfully tested. The PSLV (Polar Space Launch Vehicle)
was scheduled for launch in 1991 and was designed to carry a
5000-lb payload into geostationary orbit. Even now, a
follow-on to the PSLV, the GSLV is being built. The new
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system will use a cryogenic engine and liquid
oxygen/hydrogen fuel. (Nolan, 1991, p. 43)
The technology and expertise being displayed in
India's space launch vehicle production is being carried
over into its military space program. In May 1989, India
successfully test fired the Agni (fire) missile. The Agni
reportedly flew 625 miles. It is designed to carry a one-
ton payload 1,500 miles, but could carry a half-ton payload
about 2,200 miles. That would allow India to drop a nuclear
warhead on Beijing if it was so inclined. (Milhollin,
1989, p. 31)
Dr. Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin
Project on Nuclear Disarmament, suggests that India's
successful development of its missile and space program was
accomplished not only with Soviet aid, but with the aid of
Western firms and governments. Specifically, he notes that
Agni ' s chief designer, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, spent four months
in the United States training in 1963-64. Kalam did most of
his training at NASA's Langley research center and the
Wallop's island facility where the Scout was conceived and
launched. The Scout designs were sent to the head of the
Indian Atomic Energy Commission. Between the Scout designs
that were sent to India and the knowledge and training that
Kalam received, the United States in effect gave India the
Scout. A comparison of the Scout and the ASLV shows
distinct similarities between the two. The SLV's first
13
stage was eventually became the first stage of the AGNI
.
(Milhollin, 1989, p. 32)
Milhollin states that France gave liquid fuel
technology to India and in the mid-1970 's helped Indian
engineers develop a version of the Viking engine. That
engine was used in the Indian Prithvi (Earth) missile and
was modified to become Agni ' s second stage. German
assistance came in the form of guidance, composite
materials, and testing technologies. The guidance and
composite technologies delivered for the civilian space
program also assist in the guidance and survivability of re-
entry vehicles . (Milhollin, 1989
,
pp . 33 -34
)
India has developed its missile program ostensibly
under the cover of its civilian space program. Through
cooperative efforts with the West and Soviet Union, Indian
engineers have received valuable training and expertise.
Through outright purchases, they have obtained advanced
technologies and assistance in manufacturing, quality
control, and other areas critical to producing high
technology components for its space program. Once the ASLV
program was well underway, the Agni and Prithvi programs




The path to modernization that Brazil's space and
missile programs are following is similar to that which
India has chosen. Both India and Brazil have pursued
civilian space programs which have branched off into
military missile programs.
Brazil has used its space program to gain technology
and manufacturing modernization in a number of different
ways. It has used joint /cooperative efforts, offset
agreements, purchases of equipment, reverse engineering, and
indigenous designs. Brazil's space program had the
cooperation of the United States nearly from its beginning.
In 1965, The Brazilian Air Force Ministry created the Space
Activities Institute (IAE-Instituto de Atividades
Espaciais) . In 1966, the United States began supplying
sounding rockets, financial, and technical support to the
Brazilian space program. The governments of Brazil and the
United States already had a military assistance agreement
dating back to 1952, so this seemed another way to




The Brazilian program continued with the development
of the Sonda I, Sonda II, and Sonda III. Those projects are
described more completely in chapter IV. The projects
became more ambitious and cooperation between the
governments of the United States and Brazilian remained
close. That cooperation ended in 1977 when Brazil's
15
President Ernesto Geisel ended the 1952 military assistance
agreement with the United States. The agreement was ended
in protest of the Carter administration's pressure on
Brazil's human rights record. In March of 1977, the Carter
administration issued a report on Brazil's human rights
record that was extremely critical. The Carter
administration also tried to intervene in Brazil's nuclear
power plant agreement with West Germany and introduced a
more restrictive arms export policy towards Brazil.
(Schmidt, 1988, p. 5) Brazil did not end all relations with
the United States. However, many cooperative efforts were
canceled and Brazil sought to diversify its foreign
contacts, especially among western European nations.
(Wesson, 1986, p. 89)
In 1978 the "All-Brazilian Space Program" the MECB,
was approved. In 1983 the plan to design, build and launch
4 satellites of indigenous origin was unveiled. Two of the
satellites, the 115 kilogram SCD (Satelites de Coleta de
Dados) were designed to relay environmental data. They were
to go into a 750-kilometer orbit. The 150-175 kilogram SSR
(Satelites de Sensotiamento Remoto) was an Earth Resources
Imaging satellite. It was designed to occupy a 650
kilometer orbit and have the capability of imaging objects
on the Earth with a 40 meter resolution. (Interavia,
1991, p. 3)
16
The initial plan was to cost $1 billion, which
included $280 million for the satellites. The satellites
were to be launched on the VLS . By mid-1989, Brazil had
spent $100 million on the space segment and $700 million on
the launcher, and they were not near completion. (Interavia,
1990, p. 3)
The MECB has intermittently stalled due to lack of
funding and restrictions placed on technology transfers by
the Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR-see discussion
below) . The funding shortage is a result of changing
government priorities, a difficult economic situation, and a
shortage of orders for military hardware from Third World
customers. The MTCR has blocked sales of supercomputers,
liquid fuel engines, heat treatment capabilities, and other
technologies that are critical to Brazil's space program.
E. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)
The purpose of the MTCR is ideally to halt, but
practically slow the proliferation of ballistic missiles by
limiting sales or transfers of systems or technologies that
might make possible the manufacture of missiles. This
includes dual-use technologies, which are items that can be
used in both military and civilian space programs
The MTCR was initiated in 1982 by President Ronald
Reagan. He instructed executive agencies to implement U.S.
export restrictions on ballistic missiles and their
17
associated components. He also directed that multilateral
talks on missile proliferation control be initiated. From
1983-87 representatives from the United States, Great
Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany met
in secret and worked out the MTCR. The MTCR was announced
on April 16, 1987 as the first multilateral agreement to
control the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of
mass destruction. (Schmidt, 1990, p. 17) Since then, nine more
countries have signed the MTCR, bringing the total to 16
countries that are signatories. Brazil and India are
notably absent among signatories.
The MTCR applies to all unmanned delivery systems that
can carry a warhead weighing more than 500 kilograms over
distances greater than 300 kilometers. It applies to
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, space launch
vehicles, and any other unmanned delivery system regardless
of its designation. (Schmidt, 1990, p. 17)
The MTCR controls items that fall under two broad
categories, complete missile systems and component parts.
Category I items include whole systems, major subcomponents,
and missile production facilities. Major subcomponents are
items like reentry vehicles, solid or liquid fuel engines,
warhead components, guidance sets with CEP's (circular error
of probability) of 10 kilometers or less, etc. Category I
items are normally not exported except if end-use/no
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retransfer agreements are signed by the purchaser. (Schmidt,
1990, p. 18)
Category II items include smaller components and
missile-related technologies such as production technologies
and equipment for propellants, composite materials, flight
control systems, avionics, missile computers and software,
etc. Category II items must be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis and also must have signed end-use clauses if the item
could contribute to nuclear capable missiles.
(Schmidt, 1990, p. 18)
The MTCR is specifically credited with delaying
component and technology transfers to Brazil and Argentina,
among other nations, as Mr. Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Non-
Proliferation Policy, testified before Congress. He
specifically pointed to the "success" in stopping the
Argentine "Condor II" program. According to Mr. Sokolski,
the U.S. administration blocked exports relating to the
Condor despite claims that it was a peaceful space launch
vehicle designed for civilian, scientific, applications.
Then, critical technologies such as guidance, propellant
mixing equipment, etc. were blocked. Although Mr. Sokolski
believes that not all technologies could be blocked, he felt
that stopping key items would bring the entire project to a
halt. (U.S., Congress, 1991
,
p . 10-11)
In fact, the Condor II, which was being developed by
Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq, was supposed to be in production
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prior to Desert Storm. The delays caused by the MTCR meant
that U.S. troops were faced with the threat of modified
(extended range) Scud-B's rather than Condor II's. Whereas
the Scud has a CEP of 1 kilometer, the Condor would have had
a CEP of a few hundred meters. The liquid-fueled Scud takes
longer to prepare and fire, and is harder to find than the
highly mobile, solid-fuel Condor. (U. S ., Congress , 1991, p. 9)
The potential threat faced by U.S. troops in Desert Storm
due to more accurate and mobile Condor, and the added
difficulty in prosecuting the mobile missile threat might
have changed the complexion of the battlefield.
In Brazil's case, the MTCR has been used to block the
transfer of the Viking liquid-fuel rocket motor,
supercomputers, furnaces, and other materials critical to
their space programs. In August 1990, Dr. Gary Milhollin
Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
publicly exposed the proposed transfer to Brazil of the
Viking engine along with extensive training packages in on-
board computer, guidance systems, and launching techniques
for multi-stage rockets. This deal was supposed to be
concluded between the government of Brazil and a consortium
of firms from at least four European nations. This transfer
was primarily worked out in an offset agreement in which
Brazil would hire Arianespace for some of Brazil's space
needs if Arianespace would transfer technology in return for
the contract. (Milhollin, 1990b, pp. 10-11) But quiet
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government-to-government talks between the United States and
France halted the transfer even before Dr. Milhollin's
article. The United States felt, and the French reluctantly
agreed, that the transfer would violate both the letter and
spirit of the MTCR. (Anonymous, interview)
One week prior to his "Brazilian Bomb" article, Dr.
Milhollin exposed the proposed sale of I.B.M. supercomputers
to Brazil. He stated that the supercomputers can help
missile designers simulate rocket engine thrust, calculate
heat and pressure on reentry vehicles, and every other
aspect of flight from launch to impact. Supercomputers can
drastically cut development time and costs for flight tests.
This proposed sale came at a time when Brazilian engineers
were in Iraq working on various space projects including
Iraq's December 1989 launch of a rocket large enough to
orbit a satellite. Within the U.S. government, there was a
debate about the sale. While the Commerce and State
Departments wanted the sale approved, the Energy Department
and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency disapproved of
the sale. (Milhollin, 1990a, p. 19) The sale was eventually
disapproved.
Another transfer battle with Brazil occurred over the
heat treatment of rocket motor casings. Rocket motor
casings are heat treated to improve their strength, but
Brazil lacks the facilities to heat treat the casings for
their space launch vehicle (VLS) , and does not yet have the
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capability to build the necessary heat treatment facility.
In October 1989, a State Department licensing officer
granted a U.S. Munitions License that allowed the heat
treatment of 18 motor casings. Seven motor casings had been
shipped to the United States for heat treatment when the
case came to the attention of the nonprolif eration
community. The license was reviewed and for various
reasons, the seven previously treated motor casings were re-
exported to Brazil, and the license was revoked for the
remaining 11 motor casings. (State Department, 1990, p. 1)
F. CONCLUSIONS
Reviewing chapter two, one can see how the pattern of
space related projects has changed over the decades. The
First World model showed a pattern of military space use
branching off into civilian space use. The next generation
of space technology powers, the European community,
concentrated primarily on civilian uses of space. Now, some
of the developing nations that are attempting to use space
technology are beginning with civilian programs and are
branching off into military projects.
The Missile Technology Control Regime is designed to
prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology by
restricting both overt missile system sales and transfers of
"dual-use" technologies. The existence of the MTCR and its
efforts to control dual-use technologies indicates that
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there is a threat of ballistic missile proliferation and
that developing nations with a civilian space program may be
diverting dual-use technologies into covert ballistic
missile programs. Reasons for shifting civilian space




III. MISSILES AND THE MILITARY
A. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that emerging nations are pursuing missile
technology through their space programs leaves several
questions to be answered: (1) Why do developing nations
desire ballistic missiles? (2) Why is the United States
concerned about developing nations' space programs? (3) How
does the military affect "civilian" space programs?
The first two questions have universal qualities, that
is, they may be applied to any developing nation. The third
question may or may not apply to most nations and is more
indicative of a particular nation's character. All three
questions will be answered with respect to Brazil.
B. REASONS FOR BUILDING MISSILES
1. Political
There are several reasons why Brazil might want to
indigenously build and launch satellites or even missiles.
Those reasons could be political, economic, security, or
technical in nature. Politically, missile and space
technology represent the consummate symbols of national
prestige in the same way that dreadnoughts were a mark of
national power and prestige in the early 1900 's. In the
today's global arena, only great powers have missiles or
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space programs, so the ability to produce such items would
put Brazil in a very exclusive club. As well, missile
exports can be used to further foreign policy aims. They
can be used to improve ties with Third World nations through
co-production and licensing agreements, and they can be used
to engender the perception of self-reliance, and
independence from other First World powers. (Tollefson,
1991, p. 425)
2 . Economic
The economic argument contends that a new product
line could be very profitable. Some estimates assert that a
missile with a range of 300-1,000 km would cost between $2
million and $5 million while a satellite launching vehicle
would cost $10 million on the international market. In
1988 the operations director at Orbita estimated there was
sufficient global demand for missiles that Brazil could
export over a half-billion dollars worth per year.
(Tollefson, 1991, p. 426)
There have been ups and downs in the arms and
missile markets. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988,
there was a marked decline in the demand for weapons, though
Iraq continued to seek missile technology and hardware. In
the aftermath of the Desert Storm and the demise of the





National security is a third potential reason for
Brazil's missile program. While Brazil faces no regional
threats which would require ballistic missiles or nuclear
weapons to deter it, a case can be made that it needs
indigenous weapons production to hedge against a cutoff of
critical technology from the First World. An example of
this is the development of the Piranha missile. This was an
air-to-air missile patterned on the US Sidewinder. It was
to be put on Brazil's fighter jets. When the program was
canceled, it called into question the integrity of Brazil's
armaments pipeline. (Tollefson, 1991, p. 426) But more
importantly, a case can be made that the Malvinas War
between Britain and Argentina profoundly affected Brazil.
In that war, Brazil saw parallels between itself and
Argentina. Both were better equipped to handle internal
threats than external ones. Argentina was unable to sustain
logistical support for the war near their shores while the
British came from thousands of miles away. As well,
Brazilian military leaders felt that Argentina's inability
to conduct joint operations reflected some of Brazil's own




Brazil has worried about the need to defend against
a in the South Atlantic. There have been discussions about
forming the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) , a
Latin American version of NATO. Considering the lessons
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learned from the Malvinas war and the proposed formation of
SATO, one might accept the plausibility of the need for an
advanced defence industry, even regarding missile
production, as the national security justification for
Brazil's space and missile programs.
On the other hand, it is difficult to envision any
conflict where Brazil would be isolated against a powerful
regional enemy. These realities make the national security
argument for Brazil's space and missile programs
questionable.
4. Geopolitical
Interwoven with the political and national security
arguments is the concept of geopolitics. Within the
southern cone, Brazil and Argentina have a rivalry that goes
back nearly 400 years to their colonial days of
Spanish/Portuguese rivalry. Brazil and Argentina have vied
for dominance in the southern hemisphere in all areas, and
geopolitical theories account for many of their actions. To
some extent, Brazil seems to be quietly pursuing a vision of
manifest destiny. It is trying to develop its frontier
lands and in some instances (Paraguay and Bolivia), a large
number of Brazilians have settled across the border.
Argentina on the other hand, has seen its position in the
Southern Cone slip from first to second since World War II.
Other tensions exist in their rivalry for dominance in the
buffer states. One argument is that Argentina is pursuing
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nuclear and missile technology as an equalizer against
Brazil while Brazil, confident in its dominance, is pursuing
the same capabilities so as not to be taken by surprise by
Argentina. (Child, 1985, p. 102)
The arguments that Brazil was trying to maintain
parity with Argentina's Condor and nuclear programs appear
moot in light of the Condor's lack of success and the joint
agreement between those two countries not to pursue a
nuclear device. ("Collor, Argentina...", 1990, p. 31) But
given the nature of their longstanding rivalry, the
contentions cannot be ruled out entirely.
The geopolitical argument carries weight in another
aspect; specifically, north-south rivalry. The geopolitical
competition between Argentina and Brazil centers as much
around dependence on and independence from first world
influences, particularly the United States, as it does on
the Portuguese/Spanish rivalry. In the period of the 1940 's
through the 1960 's, Brazilian geopolitical writers freely
acknowledged that the path they followed towards their
vision of manifest destiny was as a junior partner of the
United States. There was a good faith agreement between the
United States and Brazil ( barganha leal ) that the United
States would help Brazil along its path to greatness. This
was at a time when Brazil was the United States' principal
ally in Latin America. The Argentines responded to this
"deal" by accusing Brazil of being lackeys of the United
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States and by asserting that Argentina would never
subordinate itself to a foreign power in that way. By way
of abrogating the Brazil-U.S. military assistance agreement
in 1977, Brazil renounced its dependence on the United
States. (Child, 1985, p. 35) In this light, Brazil's space
and missile programs make a case for the sovereignty and
independence of Brazil.
5. Need for Technology
A final argument is that Brazil's desire for
advanced technology is driving its space and missile
program. The space program is a high priority project
because it requires educated and well trained workers, high
technology manufacturing, improved quality assurance
techniques, improved computer industry, and much more. It
is thought that the demands of the space program would spur
the supply and proliferation of the supporting components
that it needs. In this way, Brazil's space program, with
income gained through missile sales, would partially finance
and drive the modernization of the national industrial
infrastructure
.
C. REASONS FOR U.S. CAUTION
The second question asks why the United States is
concerned about Brazil's space and missile programs. The
reasons for concern include:
(1) The connection between ballistic missiles and
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weapons of mass destruction.
(2) The destabilizing effect of ballistic missiles in
regional situations.
(3) The ability of ballistic missiles to threaten U.S.
allies and vital interests, and the United States
itself.




The first three reasons are obvious, especially in
light of events related to Desert Storm. The presence of
modified Scud-B missiles in the Iraqi arsenal during the
Gulf War changed the character of that conflict. The
potential that Iraq might mount chemical warheads on its
Scuds made those missiles a higher priority target of allied
forces. The ability for Iraq to threaten Israel, a non-
belligerent, non-bordering nation, with a chemical attack,
gave the world reason to examine the issue of missile
proliferation more closely. An issue that has drawn a
considerable amount of attention is the number of Western
companies that assisted Iraq in building up its arsenal.
Brazil's (and General Piva's) role in helping the Iraqi
missile program will be examined more closely in the




The effect of Brazil's space program on competition
in the commercial space launch industry is a very real, yet
not publicly discussed issue. In many non-attributable
interviews with government officials in Washington, a
recurring theme is that Brazil's success in space might
threaten the U.S. market share in the commercial space
launch industry. This point was not made directly, but
rather, was implied discretely. When the question of the
legitimacy of Brazil's space program was discussed, the
surplus of world, and particularly U.S. launch vehicles and
facilities was pointed to as a reason that Brazil does not
need a space program. The follow-up conclusion is that
since Brazil does not really need a space program, then the
facilities can only be intended for one thing -- ballistic
missile production and testing. And since Brazil has no
credible regional enemies, their ballistic missiles can only
be intended for the Third World arms market, thereby leading
to increased missile proliferation.
When examining the advantages of a launch facility
near the equator with range clearance to the north and east,
one can see the commercial potential of the Brazilian
Alcantara Launch Center. Only one other commercial launch
facility in the world can boast the geographic advantages of
Alcantara and that is Kourou . These launch facilities and
their advantages will be studied later. Arianespace
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estimates sales of over 5 billion francs per year at Kourou
and claims that they have secured half of the entire
satellite launch market. (Arianespace, 1991, p. 6) If these
figures are accurate, there appears to be a great deal of
hard currency profit to be gained through a successful space
program. The potential savings in fuel per launch, labor,
and production costs for space industries make Brazil a
viable competitor in the commercial space industry. These




The third question of this chapter is how does the
military affect "civilian" space programs. As stated
earlier, this question is more dependent on the character of
the country involved and is less prone to universality than
the previous two questions. In order to best answer this
question vis-a-vis Brazil, Brazil's civil-military relations
will be examined and tied into her military-industrial
complex. Specifically, the politicization of the Brazil's
military, its constitutional "prerogatives", and its role in
twentieth century society and politics must be understood in
order to comprehend the level of military control and
influence in the defense and space industries.
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1. Political Moderator
Brazil's military has an explicit political role.
In addition to its mission of defending the nation against
external threats, the army has the constitutional
responsibility of ensuring domestic tranquility, and an
historical role of moderating the political system.
In 1889 Benjamin Constant, a proponent of
"Republican Positivism" spoke at the Military College. In
that speech he said "the undeniable right of the armed
forces to depose the legitimate powers constituted by the
nation when the military understands that its honor required
this to be done, or judges it necessary and convenient for
the good of the country." This was the beginning of the
"moderating pattern" in Brazilian civil-military relations.
(Wesson, 1986
, pp . 186-187
)
The notion that the military must play a moderating
role in the government was first formally established in the
constituent assembly of 1891. It was reaffirmed in the
constituent assemblies of 1934 and 1946. Those assemblies
specifically wrote two critical clauses into the Brazilian
constitution. One clause states that the military should
obey the president "within the limits of the law." The
other says that the military is a permanent national
institution specifically charged with maintaining internal
law and order in the country and guaranteeing the normal
functioning of the three constitutional branches of
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government. (Stepan, 1988, p. 112) These clauses were seen
by some as giving the military discretionary power to obey
presidential orders. More importantly, they were seen as
justification for the military to topple the government when
it felt that either the president was acting illegally or
that governmental policies threatened the integrity of
national law and order.
The need for order has been a recurring theme in
Brazilian history as is the desire for economic development.
Nineteenth century republican positivism ended the empire
under the banner of "Order and Progress." These values were
intensified during the 1930 's and the "New State" (Estado
Novo) and were codified in the 1950-60 military ideology of
"Security and Development." (Wesson, 1986, p. 142) This last
slogan became the banner of the 1964 military government.
This moderating pattern was summarized by Alfred
Stepan as follows:
"1. All major actors attempt to co-opt the military.
A politicized military is the norm.
2
.
The military is politically heterogeneous but
also seeks to maintain a degree of institutional
unity
.
3. The relevant political actors grant legitimacy
to the military under certain circumstances to
act as moderators of the political process to
check or overthrow the executive, especially one
involving massive mobilization of new groups
previously excluded from political
participation.
4. Approval given by civilian elites to the
politically heterogenous military to overthrow
the executive greatly facilitates the
construction of a winning coup coalition. Denial
by civilians that the overthrow of the executive
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by the military is a legitimate act conversely
hinders the formation of such a coalition.
5. While it is generally held legitimate for the
military to exercise temporary political power,
it is not considered legitimate for the military
to assume direction of the government for long
periods of time.
6. A rough value congruence is the result of
civilian and military socialization via schools
and literature. The military doctrine of
development is also roughly congruent with that
of paramilitary groups. The military officers'
social and intellectual deference facilitates
military co-optation and continued civilian
leadership .
"
(Wesson, 1986, p. 187)
2. Economic Development
Economic development has been a common rationale for
the military intrusion into government affairs. A faltering
economy and the military's institutional belief in the need
for economic and industrial modernization contributed to
military involvement in the end of the Empire in 1889. This
was in part due to belief among members of the military that
the republican goals of economic modernization represented
the correct path for Brazil to follow. This theme recurred
in the 1930 insurrection. Although the violation of an
electoral agreement (one that selected presidential
candidates from Sao Paulo and Minais Gerais) was the primary
cause of the insurrection, the inability of the government
to effectively deal with the depression caused a major loss
of confidence among major economic players in Brazil. As
well, the military was disturbed by the government's failure
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Preceding the 1964 coup, an impressive economic
recovery (1955-60) faltered in 1961. The economy continued
to deteriorate rapidly in 1962 and 1963. Although there
were many factors which contributed to the coup, the one
that seemed to have the greatest impact was the economy.
Other factors such as land reform and redistribution of
wealth, as well as the government siding with the enlisted
in a protest over their treatment by commanding officers,
etc. seemed to be reactions to a deteriorating economic
situation. (Wynia, 1990, p. 226)
3. 1964 Coup
In 1964 the military assumed direct control of
government functions with no immediate intention of
relinquishing power. The military felt that the nation's
security had been seriously damaged by weakening political
institutions and needed strong authority to regain its
strength. The movement from the coup to dictatorship took
place in two stages. The first stage came in 1965-1966. At
that time, hard-liners feared that direct elections would
simply return the same politicians to office that the
military had removed. President Castelo Branco extended his
own term and renewed his extraconstitutional powers. During
this time, he lost control of his succession, and the Army
chose General Artur Costa e Silva as Castelo Branco 's
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replacement. The second stage gave the president dictatorial
power and adjourned Congress through the' Fifth Institutional
Act (AI-5) in 1968. (Wesson, 1986, p. 190)
The stated purpose of the military take-over in 1964
was economic rather than political. Politics was seen as
the primary means of economic modernization. The approach
that the new government took closely resembled conservative-
modernization strategies except that there was extraordinary-
state intrusion into the national development plan. (Wynia,
1990, p. 235) The typical conservative approach would have
minimal government involvement, except to provide incentives
to entrepreneurs. Economic growth and development would
then be guided by market forces. (Wynia, 1990, p. 121)
4. "Security and Development"
One of the important decisions of the new government
was to establish a heavy arms industry. This was a
derivative of the "Security and Development" doctrine. It
was felt that self-sufficiency in weapons would insulate
Brazil's military supplies from the changing priorities of
international politics. The arms industry was dominated by
the military. The military coordinated civilian-owned and
operated armaments companies with state owned and military
directed plants. The arms industry rapidly grew to not only
supply Brazil's armaments needs, but it became a major
exporting sector of the economy. This industry also
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furnished the armed forces with a new role in the national's
political economy. (Wesson, 1986, p. 193)
It was during this period that the aerospace
industries and the space/missile programs began to flourish.
As has been mentioned earlier, the Space Activities
Institute (IAE) was created by the Air Force Ministry in
1965 and was subordinated to the Aerospace Technical Center
(CTA) . In 1971 the Brazilian Commission of Space Activities
(COBAE) was established and subordinated to the National
Security Council. COBAE is chaired by head of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces (EMFA) and directs the MECB.
(Tollefson, 1990, p. 29)
a. Aerospace Industry
In the 1960 's and 1970 's, the Brazilian government
invested heavily in the aerospace industry. In 1964, the
government decided to create Empresa Brasileira de
Aeronaut ica (EMBRAER) . EMBRAER was a mixed public/private
sector aircraft company. The government was given 51% of
the voting shares. EMBRAER' s market strategy was to produce
aircraft for Brazil's Air Force and to create commercial
aircraft that would replace the DC-3 in Third World areas
for use in remote areas and unfinished airstrips. (Menezes,
1989, pp. 101-104) Other defense industries that received
impressive government support were Helicopteros do Brazil
S.A. (HELIBRAS) for the production of helicopters and CELMA
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for the production of aircraft engines. (Menezes,
1989, pp. 112-115)
b. Space Industry
In the realm of space systems, Avibras Aerospacial
S.A. was created in 1964 by a group of former CTA engineers
It was given the initial Sonda I project and has been a
major contributor to the Sonda II, III, and IV. (Tollefson,
1990, p. 52) Although Avibras has primarily concentrated in
short-range barrage rocket systems like the Astros II, it
was also developing the SS-150, SS-300, and SS-1000, which
are ballistic missiles with ranges of 150,300, and 1000
kilometers respectively. These missiles were based on the
Sonda IV design. (Menezes, 1989, p. 125) As of 1991, these
systems were still in either the concept or research and
development stages. (Nolan, 1991, p. 38)
The Orbita Sistemas Aerospaciais S.A. (Orbita)
company was created in 1987 to coordinate Brazil's missile
program. It is owned by a consortium of ENGESA, EMBRAER,
ESCA, IMBEL, and PARCON. It was initially intended to
develop guided missiles, rockets, and satellite launchers.
However, the military took control of some of those
programs. (Menezes, 1989, p. 126) Probably the two most well
known projects in Orbita 's inventory were the Piranha air-
to-air missile (canceled in 1988) and the MB/EE-150. The
Piranha was essentially a clone of the U.S. Sidewinder
missile while the MB/EE-150 is a ballistic missile capable
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of carrying a 500 kilogram warhead over 150 kilometers.
Follow-on projects include the MB/EE-350 , 600 , and 1000.
(Menezes, 1989,p.l27) These systems were also in either the
concept or research and development phases as of early 1991.
(Nolan, 1991, p. 38)
c . General Piva
Hugo Olivera Piva, a retired Brazilian brigadier
general, was the president of Orbita and has been an active
player both in government and in private industry. While in
uniform he headed the CTA and was in charge of both Brazil's
missile and nuclear programs.
Brazil's nuclear weapons projects began in 1977 and
were included in a larger program within the president's
Military Household (cabinet) in 1979. The military expected
to develop and initially test the technologies needed to
build a bomb and then get the president's approval to
actually build it. It has been alleged that the civilian
satellite launching vehicle (VLS) was to be the basis for a
missile capable of delivering a nuclear device over
distances up to 3,000 kilometers. ("Development of Solimoes
Nuclear Project Detailed", 1991, p. 15) The Brazilian atomic
bomb was designed at the CTA's Laboratory for Advanced
Studies by a team coordinated by Piva. In addition to his
work on Brazil's atomic bomb and ballistic missile projects,
then-Colonel Piva cultivated international contacts
associated with his projects. In 1981 he arranged for the
40
shipment of eight tons of uranium oxide and enriched uranium
to Iraq. In 1983 he tried to get the government's approval
to build a nuclear device and later that year work began on
the boreholes in Serra do Cachimbo. ("Development of
Solimoes Nuclear Project Detailed", 1991, p. 15)
When Piva left the military, he became the president
of Orbita and his previous work continued. While he was at
Orbita in 1988, word broke that the government of Libya
offered to provide $400 million annually for at least five
years to help finance the MB/EE series of missiles. ("Libya
Offers...", 1988, p. 201) But international attention to
Avibras' potential sale of Astros 2 and SS-300 made Orbita 's
deal with Libya impossible.
Piva's stay at Orbita was short-lived in part due to
the collapse of Brazil's Third World arms market. The
crisis caused the Brazilian government to cancel production
plans for the Piranha air-to-air missile. The arms market
collapsed for three main reasons. First, many of the
nations that ordered weapons in the late 1970 's were taking
delivery of them in the 1980's. The demand for weapons
tapered off from fewer orders of new systems to more orders
of spare parts. Secondly, the debt burden of many Third
World nations rose even higher, making it harder for
emerging nations to afford more weapons. Finally, and most
importantly for Brazil, the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988,
drying up a constant stream of weapons orders that had
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flourished throughout the decade. In the 1980 's, Iraq had
been one of the world's leading arms importers and was
Brazil's largest customer. (Tollefson, 1990,p.82) By late
1989, Orbita had no manufacturing, products, or sales. It
was essentially a skeletal organization whose main hope for
salvation is a regeneration of Engesa. This leaves Avibras
as the only company in Brazil capable of filling Brazil's
missile and space launch vehicle needs. (Tollefson,
1990,p.49)
With the impending demise of Orbita, Piva started
his own aerospace consulting firm, HOP (Hugo Olivera Piva)
.
He retained many of the engineers that had worked for him at
CTA and Orbita on both Brazil's missile and nuclear
projects. He has recently drawn a great deal of attention
to himself and his country by his work in Baghdad during the
most recent Gulf crisis. Piva went to Baghdad ostensibly to
build the Piranha missile for the Iraqis, which had been
canceled by the Brazilian government at the end of 1988.
But he took along the engineering team that worked on the
Brazilian Air Force's "Big Piranha" project, which was
supposed to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over
1,000 kilometers. ("Brazilian Engineers Aid in Manufacture
of Missile", 1990, p. 20) It was subsequently reported that
the HOP engineering team may have helped modify Iraq's Scud-
B missile to give them greater range and accuracy. This is
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a charge that Piva vehemently denies. ("Extending Missile
Range", 1991, p. 17)
In addition to his dealing with Iraq, Piva has
sought consulting work with the government of Iran. It has
been reported that Piva proposed assisting the Iranian
Ministry of Military Industrialization with two of their
missile projects: a 600 kilometer missile and a 1,000
kilometer missile. He offered the services of the same
engineering team that was in Iraq. ("Retired Officer
Proposes Missile Deal With Iran", 1991, p. 17) This was the
same team whose work in Iraq was supposedly on an air-to-air
missile for fighter aircraft, not ballistic missiles.
In the non-proliferation world, General Piva's
activities have caused a great deal of concern. The
civilian government has said that they are unable to control
Piva's extranational affairs because Brazil has no laws
prohibiting them. At the same time, they claim that Piva is
a loose cannon who is acting alone without the consent or
knowledge of the government . But both statements are
difficult to believe. In examining the role that the
military traditionally has played in Brazilian society, one
sees that the officer corps often forms its cliques at the
age of 12, when the boys are in military school. General
Piva rose through the ranks while the military was forming
and implementing its "Security and Development" program and
he gained stature during the 20 years that the military
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controlled the government. This was the time that the
defense industry flourished and the nuclear and space
programs gained prominence. So it is fairly clear that
Piva ' s activities were beyond those of a strictly commercial
firm. As has been shown in this thesis, the line between
private and public is often blurred in Brazil. General Piva
is reported as stating that his Piranha deals with Iraq were
broached only after consulting with and getting "the green
light" from then Brazilian Aeronautics Minister Octavio
Moriera Lima. ("Brazilian Engineers Aid in Manufacture of
Missile", 1990,20) It appears that Piva ' s activities are
designed to keep alive the industries and projects that were
of the highest priority to the military government when he
was in uniform. He seems determined to get financial
support for the projects that his government is no longer
willing or able to fund. The motivation for his actions
remains a mystery. Whether his motive is greed, ego, or
patriotism, General Piva is determined to keep Brazil's
missile programs alive.
E. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the three questions that began this
chapter should have been adequately answered. (1) Developing
nations desire ballistic missiles for political, economic,
security, technical, and geopolitical reasons. While this
list may not be all-inclusive, these broad categories and
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their justifications can be considered universal reasons why
developing nations might invest exorbitant amounts of their
national treasure in a seemingly irrational pursuit of space
technology. (2) For security reasons such as direct or
indirect threats to U.S. territory, allies, and national
interests, the United States is concerned about developing
nations' space programs. For the reason of protection of
domestic commercial space launch industries, the United
States is concerned that developing nations like Brazil
might become viable competitors. (3) In Brazil's case, the
military still wields tremendous influence in government
policymaking. The space and missile programs were major
priorities of the military government from 1964 through 1985
and are still of vital importance to the military
leadership. There is pressure in Brasilia to keep these
programs alive and progressing in spite of a $120 billion
external debt. This has led to some creative and
controversial efforts to work around small budgets and MTCR
restrictions. These efforts include greater reliance on
offset agreements and attempts to garner more foreign
funding for Brazilian missile projects. The latter method
is the most controversial and illustrates the shift in
space-use patterns mentioned previously.
To the extent that General Piva's role in Brazil's
national space and missile program is concerned, some
experts are convinced that he is a maverick, beyond the
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control of his government. Others think that General Piva
is still connected with the government and that his
international actions, while nationally embarrassing,
fulfill the military's desire for continued funding of a
vital segment of the arms industry. Still other think that
he is little more than a mercenary, selling his services to
the highest bidder.
Whatever General Piva's true nature may be is of little
consequence to this thesis, and his personal circumstances
should not be overstated. General Piva is an individual
actor, albeit an important one, in Brazil's missile and
nuclear industries. He is one example of the military's
role in Brazil's space and missile industries. The fact
that he maintains such a high profile makes him an easy
example to cite, and in this study, he is very illustrative
of the patterns of behavior in question.
The pattern that emerges from a brief study of Brazil's
civil-military relations is military intervention into
government affairs primarily for economic reasons, the use
of "Security and Development" type theories to expand arms
industries for economic and defense purposes, and a tendency
to protect those industries as the military deems necessary.
From this aspect one can generalize that a strong military
presence in a developing nation will influence a civilian
space program towards missile production.
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PART II
Part two focuses on the technological issues involved in
space launch vehicles. The primary focus of this section
is to examine some of the technologies, systems, and
facilities in Brazil's space program. Brazil's systems and
facilities will be juxtaposed with U.S. systems and
facilities and comparisons will be made where practicable.
This section will attempt to answer the following questions:
(1) Why does Brazil want its own launch facility?
(2) What bottlenecks in technology are slowing Brazil's
space program?
(3) What critical technologies are required for Brazil's
space program to be successful?
(4) How is the MTCR affecting Brazil's space program?
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IV. TECHNOLOGY OF SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES
A . INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine some technologies that are
needed in a space launch vehicle. This is more of a macro
rather than a micro view of technology designed to
familiarize the reader with some of the terminology that is
used when discussing rockets and missiles. It is important
to understand the predominant technologies in order to
understand the questions that surround Brazil's space
program such as
:
(1) Why does Brazil want liquid fuel technology?
(2) What are the advantages of liquid versus solid fuel?
There are many technologies that go into the production
of a space vehicle. The major "macro" systems fall under
the headings of (1) propulsion and (2) guidance and control.
The area of propulsion is one of the more complex and
least understood concepts in the field of rocketry. There
are three main types of rocket propulsion: solid fuel,
liquid fuel, and cryogenic engines. There are advantages




Brazil currently has a considerable level of experience
and expertise in solid fuel technology. Although solid fuel
engines are the most basic of the major propulsion systems
they are still complex systems that require a high degree of
advanced engineering, manufacturing, and technology. Some
of the technologies it involves are:
(1) Propellant grain design.
(2) Motor casing design.
(3) Loading the propellent into the casing.
(4) Nozzle design.
1. Propellant Design
Overall, propellent grain design is intended to
match the propellent with the launch vehicle and its
mission. The designer must analyze the thrust-time curve
for the required mission and develop a propellent that will
match the mission profile, while taking into account
variables such as weight, envelope, etc.(Scippa, 1988, p. 7-1)
Some of the characteristics that must be considered
when selecting a propellent are burn rate, temperature
sensitivity, specific impulse, and density. Other
properties include storage stability, hazard




There are two basic types of grain architecture:
free standing grains and case-bonded grains. Free standing
grains are cartridge-loaded into the rocket motor casing
after manufacture. Case-bonded grains are bonded to the
motor casing during casting and curing steps of the
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propellent. Case-bonded grains tend to deliver somewhat
higher performance, but free standing grains are less
expensive and easier to handle, so there is a trade-off in
uses. Free standing grains are usually used for smaller
rockets (propellent diameter less than 100 mm and weight
below 10 kg) where case-bonded propellants are almost always
used for larger rockets (propellent grain diameter greater
than 500 mm or weigh above 300 kg) . (Zeller, 1988, p. 8-2)
2. Motor Casing Design
The solid motor case is a minimum-weight pressure
vessel. It (a) protects and stores the propellent grain,
(b) serves as the combustion chamber for high
temperature/pressure burning of propellent grain, (c)
mechanically/structurally interfaces with other rocket
components like the nozzle, igniter, etc., (d) is a primary
airframe during missile flight. (Evans, 1988,p.4A-l)
The goal of motor case design is to create a case
that is as lightweight as possible within the bounds of cost
and technology. The results of proper motor case design are
greater missile performance through a higher motor mass
fraction (propellent weight/total motor weight). (Evans,
1988,p.4A-l)
Solid Rocket motor cases must be able to accommodate
considerable levels of thrust and bending and concentrated
loads from the skirts and any attachments. The motors
typically operate from 500-3000 psi and the exterior surface
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temperature in excess of 1200 degrees fahrenheit due to
propellent combustion temperatures between 5000-6000 degrees
fahrenheit. (Evans, 1988,p.4A-l)
Nozzle design is another major factor in rocket
motor architecture. There are several kinds of nozzles used
in solid rocket motors and their control mechanisms are of
extreme importance. The purpose of the nozzle on a solid
rocket motor is to channel and control the expansion of hot
gasses coming from the combustion chamber. In this way,
thrust is created and controlled. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-1)
3. Nozzle Design
Nozzle design differs in scale and complexity
depending on the mission of the vehicle. For instance, in a
tactical missile with a short duration burn time, the nozzle
may be a simple metal or reinforced plastic design whereas
for ballistic or space applications, higher-level materials
and control devices are required. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-1)
General parameters that must be considered in
designing rocket motor nozzles are the propellent burn time,
propellent type, operating pressures within the chamber and
in the atmosphere, the exit cone expansion ratio, thrust
vector controls, nozzle submergence, cost, shelf-life, etc.
Propellent type, burn time, and internal operating
temperatures dictate the materials and structural strength
of the nozzles. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-2) The performance of
the rocket seems more influenced by the external operating
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pressure (determined by the rocket stage) , the exit cone
expansion ratio, thrust vector control, and nozzle
submergence
.
The exit cone expansion ratio is the ratio of the
width of the nozzle throat to the with of the exit cone.
Generally, the higher the ratio the higher the thrust. The
engine operates most efficiently when the static pressure of
the exit plane is equal to the surrounding atmospheric
pressure. Thus, expansion ratios of 7-15 are best suited
for lower stages while ratios of 15-80 are typical of upper
stages. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-2)
Nozzle submergence describes the position of the
nozzle relative to the combustion chamber. A submerged
nozzle is recessed into the combustion chamber whereas an
external nozzle is outside of the combustion chamber. The
two configurations give different flow patterns for escaping
gasses. An external nozzle is typically a fixed nozzle with
a simpler design. Given that it is farther from the
propellent grain it suffers lower throat erosion. The
submerged nozzle leads to more complex designs and higher
cost, but it allows increased performance and can be
configured with movable nozzles or flex bearings. (Truchot,
1988, p. 3-3)
4 . Thrust Vector Controls
Movable nozzles and flexible bearings are examples
of thrust vector controls (TVC) . TVC ' s are required on many
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solid rocket motors and can have relatively simple or
complex designs. Movable nozzles are the most complex
types. The nozzle is usually hinged by a flexible bearing,
a ball and socket, or a hydraulic bearing joint. (Truchot,
1988, p. 3-11) In essence, these systems control the
direction in which the nozzle is pointing, and thus the
direction of the thrust. Brazilian engineers are trying to
perfect this technology for their satellite launch vehicle
(VLS) .
Some of the simpler TVC designs are the fluid
injection system and introduction of a solid device into the
nozzle supersonic stream. Brazil uses the fluid injection
system in the Sonda IV. In the fluid injection system, an
inert liquid is injected into the supersonic stream of
gasses escaping through the nozzle. The liquid disrupts the
gas flow and causes a shock wave and thus a side force which
controls the thrust direction. In the solid device method,
a solid, or mechanical device is introduced into the
supersonic stream. The gas flow disruption has the same
effect as the injected liquid in controlling thrust
direction. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-15)
C. LIQUID FUEL
Liquid fuel systems are the premier technologies that
the Brazilian government would like to import or perfect.
The term liquid propellent describes both oxidizers (liquid
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oxygen, liquid fluorine, etc.) and fuels (kerosene, alcohol,
liquid hydrogen, etc.) . Propellants furnish the energy and
working substance for the engine and are one of the most
important considerations in rocket engine design.
Propellant selection is sharply influenced by price, supply,
handling, and storage concerns. (Huzel, 1971, p. 18)
Liquid propellants typically come in two forms, either
monopropellants or bipropellants . Liquid monopropellants
are either a mixture of oxidizer and fuel or are a single
compound that can be decomposed, giving off the necessary
heat and gas. Monopropellants must be stable in natural or
controlled environments, but should give off hot gasses when
pressurized, heated, or fed through a catalyst. Liquid
monopropellant engines have the advantage of simplicity in
tankage, plumbing, flow control and injection. Their major
drawback is a lack of performance. They have a lower
density impulse (to be addressed later) . However, their use
is appropriate as a secondary power source in rocket engines
in driving turbopump gas generators and auxiliary power
drives that govern attitude and roll control jets. Some
monopropellants do offer high performance, but they are
somewhat unstable and are deemed unsafe for rocket use.
(Huzel, 1971, pp. 18-19)
Bipropellants offer the performance that monopropellants
do not. The trade-off comes in the form of a more
complicated system design. Bipropellant systems have the
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oxidizer and the fuel in separate tanks. The two remain
separated until they reach the combustion chamber. This
system offers high performance with greater operational
safety. (Huzel, 1971, p. 19)
When bipropellants are mixed in the combustion chamber,
they are ignited through one of a number of devices: (a)
chemical pyrotechnics, (b) spark plugs, (c) injection of a
spontaneously combustible material before the propellant, or
(d) a small combustor which utilizes either (a) or (b) for
initial ignition. (Huzel, 1971, p. 18)
Some bipropellants, known as hypergolics, ignite
spontaneously upon mixing. Hypergolics permit greatly
simplified ignition, but pose the risk of violent explosions
in the case of accidental mixing or other hardware failures.
(Huzel, 1971,p.l8)
Cryogenic propellants are liquified gasses with a
boiling point between -230 and -430 degrees fahrenheit and a
critical temperature between 10 and -400 degrees fahrenheit.
The most common cryogenic propellants are liquid oxygen,
liquid hydrogen, liquid fluorine, and oxygen diflourine.
Combinations of the above liquids are also common.
Cryogenic propellants offer even greater density impulse but
the tradeoffs again come in the form of more complex
systems. One of the drawbacks of cryogenic systems comes in
the storage and handling of the propellants. Complex
insulation systems must be used to keep the propellant from
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evaporating. The complexity of the system often depends on
the length of time for which the material is being stored.
Adequate ventilation is a must in preventing dangerous
buildups of escaping gas. Also, because cryogenic systems
are of such demanding specifications and tolerances,
handling equipment must be very sensitive to atmospheric
moisture, given that any impurities may cause jamming of
subsystems like valves and flow mechanisms. (Huzel,
1971, p. 19)
The term dynamic impulse has been used several times
thus far. Simply stated, dynamic impulse is the total
impulse delivered per unit volume of propellant. It is the
specific impulse of a fuel multiplied by its density (Huzel,
1971, p. 20). A graphic illustration of the differences
between propulsion methods can be seen in Figure 2, which
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Figure 2: Specific Impulse Of Various Propellants
(Briscoe, 1963, p. 20)
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compares the specific impulses of various types of fuel.
One can clearly see the advantages of bipropellant and
cryogenic systems over solids and monopropellants in terms
of impulse and potential lift capability.
D. CONCLUSIONS
High technology improves the performance of space flight
in two critical areas. Liquid and cryogenic engines produce
more thrust than solid fuel. Their efficiency represents
"more bang for the buck." In addition to improved
efficiency, high technology tends to improve system
reliability. Of course, well trained maintenance personnel
are vital in order to maximize efficiency and reliability.
As in any business the goal of the space launch industry is
to produce the highest quality goods and services at the
lowest possible price. And when the payloads being lifted
are billion dollar satellites, there is no room for error.
If Brazil wants to compete in the arena of space flight, it
needs high technology systems to be efficient and reliable.
The high cost of technology that allows a developing
nation's space program to take advantage of more advanced
propulsion systems is a serious question. The
technological, educational, and manufacturing hurdles that
must be overcome in developing a modern space program can
drain the private sector of the manpower and brainpower that
would otherwise be put into other sectors of the economy.
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The potential payoff from the space program must justify the
overall costs it imposes.
Therein lies the dilemma facing Brazil. Although in the
short term it would be more economical for Brazil to buy,
rent or lease its space needs (satellites, lift vehicle,
launch facilities, etc.) from an already developed nation,
Brazil has decided to invest in space with no guarantees of
a positive payoff. The vision of Security and Development
that was started in 1964 is still being pursued today. The
space industries that Brazil created have labored to produce
modern systems and engineer advanced technologies. Brazil
has invested heavily in its space program and still has not
developed liquid fuel engines or movable nozzle systems. In
order for Brazil to succeed as a contender in the commercial
space launch market, it must have the technology with which
to compete on a First World footing. This will require (1)
perfection of existing solid fuel systems to compete in
commercial satellite launches, (2) an even larger investment
in space research and development, or (3) importing




This chapter will familiarize the reader with some of
the rocket systems that are relevant to Brazil. In
particular, the U.S. Scout system and the Brazilian Sonda
and VLS programs are described. The Scout is very important
as a comparison because it is similar to systems like
Brazil's Sonda and India's Agni in technical
characteristics. But more importantly, the Scout was a
building block for future US space projects and it was used
for peaceful purposes. The success of the Scout program is
a model for aspiring space nations to follow, but it makes
U.S. criticism of similar systems look very cartelist and
hypocritical
.
The systems that Brazil has developed are very similar
to early U.S. space systems due largely to U.S. influence in
early stages of Brazil's space program. The United States
supplied Brazil with its first sounding rockets and helped
develop its launch facilities. The Sonda (sounding rocket)
series is based on the Scout design and one can readily draw
a parallel between the Scout's mission and the stated
peaceful intentions of the Brazilian government's Sonda
project. But when examining the capabilities of both
systems, one must also keep in mind their potential military
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applications. The follow-on to the Sonda series is the
Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) which is a multi-stage Sonda
IV with strap on boosters. It is designed to lift future
Brazilian satellites into orbit and, if practicable, compete
on the world market lifting foreign commercial payloads into
space. One such satellite, the Brazilsat, will also be
addressed in this chapter.
B . SCOUT
The Scout series was initiated by the U.S. Air Force but
was transferred to NASA in 1958. The NASA Scout, a four-
stage lift vehicle using a solid rocket motor, became
operational in 1960 and was designed to lift a 190 pound
payload into a 100 nautical mile circular orbit. Various
modifications to the diameter, heat shielding, and
propellant improved the performance of the solid rocket
motors, as the Scout grew from four to five stages by 1968.
(Hazard, 1977, pp. 5-15, 5-16)
By 1971 the improved Scout had the capability to place a
570 pound payload into a 100 nautical mile orbit or a 50
pound payload into a sunsynchronous orbit. (Hazard, 1977, p.
5-17) The Scout was still in service in 1977 and was, at
that time, planned for continued use and production as an
expendable launch vehicle even after the arrival of the
space shuttle. (Hazard, 1977, p. 5-15)
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The four-stage Scout is approximately 72 feet long, with
a 45-inch diameter and a launch weight of 40,000 pounds. It
develops 100,000 pounds of lift off thrust and can lift a
payload for orbital, re-entry, or probe missions. An
optional fifth stage is used for placing an object in a
highly elliptical orbit using an apogee kick motor (AKM)
.
(Hazard, 1977, p. 5-18)
Scout uses an inertial guidance system for its first
three stages. The inertial guidance is used with a
proportional control system to govern the vehicle through
its first stage burn. The second and third stages are
controlled by hydrogen peroxide reaction jet motors operated
by on-off switches. The inertial reference unit is then
used to aim the spin axis for the payloads proper spacial
orientation. (Hazard, 1977, p. 5-18)
C . SONDA
The Brazilian Sonda or sounding rocket program began in
1965 with the Sonda I. This was a small meteorological
rocket designed by the private firm Avibras . The Sonda I
was a two-stage vehicle propelled by solid rocket motors.
It was designed to conduct atmospheric studies at an
altitude of 60-75 kilometer. The Sonda I gave Avibras
experience in the field of solid propellants and short-range
tactical missiles. (Boscov, 1982, p. 201)
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The Sonda II program began in 1966 and soon overtook the
Sonda I program. The Sonda II was a one-stage rocket
designed to carry a 20 kilogram payload to an altitude of
100 kilometers. The Sonda II was to become the basis for
Brazilian rocket technology. It was produced regularly in
three different versions and became the test platform for





The Sonda III program commenced in 1969 with the
beginning of the design and development of a two-stage
rocket that would carry a 50 kilogram payload to an altitude
of 500 kilometers. The Sonda III was the first Brazilian
rocket to carry a complete instrumentation system which
consisted of the following: separation system, second stage
ignition, data acquisition during all phases of flight,
teledestruct , three axes attitude control of payload, a sea
recovery system, and an enhanced electronics package. The
Sonda III prototype was launched in February 1976. (Boscov,
1982, p. 202)
Two versions of the Sonda III were developed. The basic
configuration was for payloads of 50-80 kilograms and higher
altitudes. A second version was used for heavier payloads
130-160 kilograms, and lower altitudes. In the first
version the propellent block in the second stage was twice
as long as in the second variant. (Boscov, 1982, p. 202)
62
The Sonda IV program was designed to develop
technologies that will later be used in the Satellite Launch
Vehicle (VLS) . As part of the growing technological base
the Sonda IV incorporated many new advances, although new
technologies must still be developed or acquired for the
VLS.
One of the technological advances from the Sonda III to
Sonda IV was the use of a secondary injection system (SIS)
for control of the upper stage. (Boscov, 1982,p.208) The SIS
uses the injection of an inert gas, nitrogen in this case,
into one side of the nozzle. The impact on the gas
expansion causes a side force which changes the direction of
the rocket. (Truchot, 1988, p. 3-15)
D. SATELLITE LAUNCH VEHICLE (VLS)
The Brazilian Satellite Launch Vehicle (VLS) is planned
to be a four-stage rocket using conventional solid rocket
propellant. The VLS main booster will strongly resemble
both the Scout and Sonda rockets but will have four strap on
boosters. The VLS is designed to carry a 175 kilogram
payload into a 750 kilometer circular equatorial orbit.
Brazil's Alcantara facility will be the primary VLS launch
site. ("Description Of VLS System", 1988, p. 1-18)
The following subsystems comprise the main elements of
the VLS:
(1) First Propulsive Stage
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(2) Second Propulsive Stage
(3) Third Propulsive Stage and Guidance Control Module
(4) Fourth Propulsive Stage and Satellite Adapter
(5) Shroud (Heat Shield)
The first stage is composed of four S-43 solid rocket
motors strapped onto the second stage. Each motor has an 11
degree fixed inclined nozzle. The thrust vector control
(TVC) is the secondary injection system (SIS) used in the
Sonda IV. Separation between the first and second stages
occurs at an altitude of approximately 25 kilometers.
("Description Of VLS System", 1988,p.6-18)
The second stage also used the S-43 motor with a nozzle
exit to throat ratio of 36:1 as opposed to 12:1 on the first
stage. This larger expansion ratio is available due to the
lower atmospheric pressure at 25 kilometers. The larger
expansion ratio generates higher vehicle velocity.
("Description Of VLS System", 1988, p. 8-18)
The third stage has a S-40 solid rocket motor. The S-40
uses a flex joint movable nozzle TVC for control. The
guidance and control modules are located in the third stage
and contain the inertial platform and the electronics that
ensure the proper flight sequencing and trajectory during
the first three stages. This section also contains the
telemetry equipment and attitude control systems. The
attitude control system permits control in the roll axis
during 2nd and 3rd stages, maneuvering and orienting the
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vehicle for spin-up, to spin 2-3 revolutions per second
(rps) and to remove coning motions before the separation and
ignition of the fourth stage. ("Description Of VLS System",
1988, p. 10-18)
The fourth stage is a S-44 motor, satellite adapter
structure and electronics. The S-44 is made of a composite
material of Kevlar/epoxy resin and has a fixed nozzle. The
satellite adapter is a conical structure that contains the
separation system and supports the electronic equipment
which transmits functional parameters to the ground station.
("Description Of VLS System", 1988, p. 12-18)
A heat shield protects the satellite during ascent
through the low atmosphere. The heat shield is a cone-
cylinder-cone shape made in two halves of a composite
fiberglass material. ("Description Of VLS System", 1988,
p. 13-18)
E. BRAZILSAT
The Brazilian complete space mission (MECB) is a project
designed to place Brazilian-made satellites into space using
indigenously produced launch vehicles and facilities.
("Brazil's Space Program...", 1987, p. 75) The VLS is an
integral part of the MECB while the project's goals are to
launch at least four satellites and exploit the data
received from them. ("Brazil's Space Program...", 1987, p. 75)
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Brazil already has two communications satellites known
as Brazilsats in geosynchronous orbit. Brazilsat 2 was
launched in 1986 aboard an Ariane 3 launched from Kourou,
French Guiana. Brazilsat 2 is capable of relaying 12,000
phonecalls or 24 television channels simultaneously.
("Brazil's Space Program...", 1987, p. 75) Arianespace also
lifted two remote Earth sensing satellites for Brazil.
Those satellites are ostensibly designed to help Brazil in
agricultural planning and resource protection planning. In
addition to communications satellites, Brazil hopes to orbit
two environmental data collection satellites and two remote
sensing satellites in the early 1990's. (Brazil's...,
1987, p. 75)
The satellite programs, and especially the Sonda IV and
VLS programs are currently stalled for two reasons: (1) a
shortage of funds caused by economic problems and (2)
limited cooperation and technology transfers from first
world nations, fearing Brazilian projects will increase
world wide missile proliferation.
F . BOTTLENECKS
Economically, Brazil is in precarious shape. With a
$120 billion debt, it is barely able to service the interest
on the debt. It was bad enough that in 1987, then-president
Sarney declared a moratorium on payments on a portion of the
nation's debt. This has led to some imaginative
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arrangements in order to keep funding for the space program,
including allegations of both official and unofficial
ballistic missile cooperation with Libya and Iraq.
Technologically, Brazil is fairly primitive in
comparison to the United States as evidenced by the afore-
mentioned systems. The latest Brazilian lift vehicle, the
Sonda IV, is based on the 40-year Scout system. Brazil's
ability to close this technological gap is being hindered by
the United States and other signatories to the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
.
There are many bottlenecks in Brazil's missile and space
launch vehicle production capabilities. These are caused as
much by economic difficulty as they are by MTCR
restrictions. As demonstrated in the previous examples,
liquid fuel, supercomputer, and heat treatment technologies
are among the most obvious inhibitors to Brazil's progress.
But other technological deficiencies exist in pyrotechnics
for rocket stage separation, inertial guidance and
accelerometers , composite materials production, computer
hardware and software, and other high technology
capabilities. The inability to domestically produce these
critical items is widely held to be a consequence of a
poorly educated work force, and the lack of a broad
industrial base with advanced manufacturing and quality
control capabilities. For Brazil to successfully compete in
space, it must (1) renovate its entire national industrial
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base and educational system, or (2) procure what it needs
from outside sources.
The question of how quickly Brazil can make up the gap
in technology is a function of its economy, the
effectiveness of the MTCR, and the Brazilian government's
policy towards MTCR compliance. Brazil is trying to expand
its industrial base. Economic pressures are making such an
expansion increasingly difficult, but Brazil is trying to
make the structural changes it needs to invigorate its
economy. During President Fernando Collor de Mello's visit
to Washington, D.C. in early July of 1991, he said that
Brazil was undergoing structural reforms. Those reforms
include selling government -owned enterprises, offering
investment incentives, deregulating some industries,
reforming its tax system, and reducing trade barriers. As
well, Brazil plans to insert its economy into the
international economy. (Michaels, 1991, p. 3)
While in Washington, President Collor had high
visibility meetings with President Bush. He also met with
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, Federal reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan, and Treasury Undersecretary David Mulford to
assure them of Brazil's intention to repay interest in debt
arrears in the sum of $8 billion. This strategy is designed
to put lenders at ease about renegotiating Brazil's debt.
(Michaels, 1991, p. 3) These structural changes in Brazil's
economic policies are vital to the restructuring of Brazil's
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industrial base. A timetable for these changes is
impossible to predict, as much of it depends on future
negotiations on debt restructuring.
Meanwhile, the MTCR continues to restrict the flow of
technology to various space and missile-related projects.
But there are ways around some of the restrictions in the
MTCR. One loophole is the range and payload limits. Both
the Orbita MB/EE-150 (range 150 kilometers) and the
unmodified Scud-B (range 280 kilometers) do not fall within
the MTCR limits. (Schmidt, 1990, p. 17) Although this might
not help in the construction of larger projects directly,
technologies received for these smaller projects could
conceivably be modified or re-engineered for other projects.
Brazil is still seeking technology in the form of offset
agreements and bartering. In addition to pursuing liquid-
fuel technology from the French, Brazil has approached the
Chinese in 1985 and offered to trade its solid fuel
technology to China in return for help in liquid fuel and
guidance system technology. (Milhollin, 1991b, p. 7) Although
there was an agreement in principle to launch the Chinese
Long March rocket out of Alcantara, that event has yet to
materialize
.
To further complicate Brazil's quest for missile
technology, in December 1990, President Bush announced the
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, which was took
effect in the summer of 1991. Among other things, this new
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initiative added trade in missile technology as an activity
that triggers automatic sanctions. (Milhollin, 1991a, p. 8)
It will take time to determine what effect the new
initiative will have on Brazil's missile industry.
G. CONCLUSIONS
Brazil has continued with its ambitious space program,
the MECB, with mixed results. Its domestically-produced
satellites are still awaiting a Brazilian-manufactured space
launch vehicle. Brazil's funding shortage and the
restrictions on technology transfers imposed by the MTCR
make it difficult to know when Brazil will have a
commercially competitive space launch capability.
Further complicating the issue are events in the Soviet
Union, Middle East, and Eastern Europe which make it even
more difficult to predict the future of the "New World
Order." Brazil's missile and space industries depend
heavily on other nations for the capital necessary for
industrial modernization, and research and development.
Likewise, Brazil needs to find partners that are willing to
trade technology, and enter co-production and licensing
agreements. Whether the collapse of the bi-polar world and
the surfacing of old ethnic tensions, accompanied by the
emergence of new Third World nations, will spur a resurgence
in the arms market remains to be seen. Although the Middle
Eastern arms market appears to have collapsed in the wake of
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the recent Gulf War, the modified Scud-B proved itself to be
a useful weapon in terrorizing Israeli and Saudi cities,
diverting U.S. military assets, and capturing the attention
of the news media. A resurgence in new regional tensions
could revitalize and recapitalize Brazil's missile industry.
In the meantime, Brazil will continue to sluggishly
pursue its VLS program, whose first launch has been pushed
back from 1991 to 1993, owing to domestic fiscal realities.
Unless Brazil can get massive amounts of foreign currency





This chapter is designed to introduce the reader to
rudimentary orbital mechanics and demonstrate why the
geographic location of a launch facility is of such
importance to a space program. Some of the questions that
this chapter will answer are:
(1) Why does Brazil want its own launch facility?
(2) Why does Brazil not just rent or lease what it needs
from the US?
(3) What advantages would a Brazilian launch facility
provide?
Answers to these questions will show that, due to
latitude and range safety, satellites can be placed into
commercially desirable orbits much less expensively from
Brazil than from the United States. This will show the
commercial potential of Brazil's space program and offer
some rational justification for it.
B. LAUNCH VEHICLE CONSIDERATIONS
There are many factors that must be considered when
launching a space vehicle. Those factors include:
(1) Payload mission and Altitude.
(2) Orbital Inclination and Range Safety.
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1. Payload Mission and Altitude
Payload mission determines most of the latter
requirements. Different missions require different
altitudes and inclination and thus drive the launch location





90-300 miles Imaging, Reconnaissance, Manned Space
Station, Scientific
300-630 miles Earth Observation, Roving Weather
Satellite, Navigation, Surveillance
630-1250 miles Surveillance, Electronic Monitoring,
Communications, Transit Navigation
3100-6200 miles Sparsely Populated, Scientific
6200-13,700 miles NavSat Precision Orbit
13,700-21,750 miles Little Used
21,750-22,370 miles Geosynchronous, Broadcast,
Communication and Data Relay,
Surveillance, Weather
(Smithsonian Air and Space poster)
Achieving the desired altitude for a specific
mission is another consideration. In order to place an
object deeper into space, the payload will require a higher
characteristic velocity in order to overcome the Earth's
gravity and attain its proper altitude. TABLE 2 gives a
















100 nm ref Circular Orbit
200 nm Circular Orbit
500 nm Circular Orbit
1000 nm Circular Orbit
Synchronous Transfer Ellipse
Synchronous (Equatorial)*
* From Cape Canaveral requires a 28.5 degree plane change.
(Hazard, 1978, p. 3-3)
2. Orbital Inclination and Range Safety-
Due to its latitude of 28.5 degrees above the
equator, Cape Canaveral cannot launch a payload directly
into a geosynchronous orbit . Instead, it must launch into a
transfer ellipse and then execute a 28.5 degree plane change
to place a satellite into an equatorial orbit. An
explanation of inclination, plane change, transfer ellipse,
and various synchronous orbits follows. The term
inclination refers to the angle above the equator created by
the path of the satellite. FIGURE 3 on the following page,
is a good representation of inclination, although
inclination is typically measured northward from the east
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Figure 3: Inclination
(Hazard, 1978, p. 3-4)
The ability to achieve the desired inclination is a
function of the rocket's fuel supply and by range safety
considerations. A plane change can occur outside the
atmosphere but it is costly. It requires that the orbiter
have its own onboard fuel supply. Even small changes can
incur large penalties. FIGURE 4 illustrates how a plane
change occurs. This figure demonstrates a plane change of
less than 5 degree.
As the satellite crosses the equator, a propulsion
burn is initiated in order to move the satellite in the
desired direction. When the satellite has reached its
desired orbital plane, its engines are again fired to
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Figure 4 : Orbital Plane Change
(Hazard, 1978, p. 3-21)
The more desirable and cost effective maneuver is to
launch a payload directly into its preferred orbital plane.
This is not always practicable from all launch facilities.
Geography and range safety considerations limit the launch
options for some missions. One does not wish for expended
boosters to drop over populated area or on highly travelled
sea lanes. Most difficulties arise when attempting to launch
directly into a geosynchronous or sunsynchronous orbit.
C. ORBITS
1 . Geosynchronous
Synchronous satellites are an often misunderstood
concept. When a satellite stays over the same point on the
earth constantly it is said to be in a geosynchronous orbit.
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This only occurs when the orbiter is positioned over the
equator, it is travelling due east relative to the earth,
and it is in a circular orbit at an altitude of 19323 nm.
When all of these criteria are met, the satellite will orbit
the earth with the exact period that the earth is rotating
and thus will remain directly over one spot on earth.
(Hazard, 1977, p. 3-23)
If a satellite is offset to the north or south of
the equator at the synchronous altitude its orbit will be in
concert with earth's rotational period. However, it will
oscillate above and below the equator within the degree of
the offset. For example, a satellite placed in a
synchronous orbit 10 degrees north of the equator will
oscillate between 10 degrees north and 10 degrees south
latitude, crossing the equator every 12 hours, while
maintaining its longitude relative to the earth. (Hazard,
1977, p. 3-23)
2 . Sunsynchronous
Sun-synchronous orbits are orbits in which the
satellite passes over the same point on earth at the same
local time daily. As the earth orbits around the sun and
the amount of sunlight changes, the time in which a
satellites passes over a given point on earth changes
accordingly. In this way a satellite passes over an object
when the sun's light is the same position, rather than when
the clock's hands are in the same position. In order to
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achieve a sun-synchronous orbit, a satellite must be placed
into a slightly retrograde orbit. A retrograde orbit is one
in which the inclination is over 90 degrees.
D. LAUNCH FACILITIES
The following discussion of launch facilities in the
United States and French Guiana will provide the context for
understanding Brazil's geographic advantages.
1. United States
In the United States, three launch sites have
traditionally been used for the space program, Cape
Canaveral, Florida, Vandenberg AFB, California, and Wallop's
Island, Virginia.
a. Cape Canaveral, Florida
Cape Canaveral, home of the Kennedy Space Center, is
the most famous of all the launch centers. It was from
there that the Gemini, Apollo, and Space Shuttle missions
were launched. Cape Canaveral offers the United States a
facility for launching in an easterly direction,
capitalizing on the rotation of the earth for satellite
orbiting. Range limits (Figure 5) prohibit retrograde
orbits and orbits with an inclination much above 57 degrees
north latitude. Cape Canaveral's latitude also limits the
ability to launch satellites into an equatorial plane for a
true geosynchronous orbit. But Cape Canaveral is probably
the most developed of the U.S. space facilities
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accommodating all types of launch vehicles including the
Space Shuttle.
28° 42°
USSR , f 45° (47° INCLINATION)
108"
115° (35" INCLINATION)
FIGURE 5: GEOGRAPHIC LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS FROM CAPE CANAVERAL
(Hazard, 1978, p. 3-6)
b. Vandenberg, Air Force Base
Vandenberg AFB in California is located about 80
miles north of Los Angeles along the Pacific coast.
Vandenberg is responsible for west coast missile and space
launches. It operates the Western Test Range tracking
network and follows launches into the Indian Ocean where the
Eastern Test Range tracking system (Cape Canaveral) takes
over. Vandenberg provides the United States with access to
polar launches. Polar missions are launched due south for
range safety considerations. See Figure 6. Vandenberg also
maintains an alternate space shuttle launch facility. It
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has been maintained in an active caretaker (mothball) status
since 1986 and is intended to be ready to launch shuttle
missions on 18 months notice. Vandenberg AFB primarily
launches satellites and is still active ICBM base.










Figure 6 : Geographic Launch Constraints From Vandenberg
(Hazard, 1978, p. 3-6!
c. Wallop's Island, Virginia
Although a relatively obscure launching facility,
Wallop's Island , Virginia was an important facility in the
development of the US Space program. Wallop's Island is
located near the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, close to
Virginia's Eastern Shore. It was the third U.S. launch
facility, behind Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg, and was
established in 1946. It was primarily used for sounding
rocket experiments but was also used to place satellites
into orbit. See Figure 7. It was the home for the Scout
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program and is connected with the Goddard Space Center
(Greenbelt, MD) . Since 1979 only one satellite has been
launched from Wallop's Island. In 1986, General Dynamics
received permission from NASA and the Department of
Transportation to commence commercial launches from Wallop's
Island. (Jane's, 1988, p. 489)
Figure 7: Geographic Launch Constraints From Wallop's Island
(Hazard, 1978, p. 5-27)
2 . France
The Arianespace launch facility is in Kourou, French
Guiana. The Guiana Space Center (CSG) is located just 5
degrees north of the equator. Its location and range
clearance allow for northerly launches for sun-synchronous
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orbits and easterly with only minor maneuvering to achieve a
geostationary transfer orbit. The original facility was
opened in 1971 and in 1986 a second launch facility was
opened. With the expansion of the CSG, the goal of
Arianespace is to launch half of the world's commercial
satellites. (Ariane, 1991
,
pp . 22-25 ) Current revenue
estimates based on eight launches annually indicate planned
sales of 5 billion French francs per year. (Ariane,
1991, p. 4)
3. Brazil
a. Barreira do Inferno
Brazil has two major launch facilities, Barreira do
Inferno and the Alcantara Launching Center (CLA) . Barreira
do Inferno, literally translated as "Barrier of Hell" was
the first major launching facility in Brazil. It is located
near Natal, which is 5 degrees 55 minutes South latitude
and 35 degrees 10 minutes West longitude. ("Brazil's Space
Program...", 1981, p. 77) It was here that the Brazilian
space program received its start with the Sonda program.
b. Alcantara (CLA)
The CLA is located at 2 degrees 17 minutes South
latitude and 44 degrees 23 minutes West latitude. Alcantara
was built to launch the VLS, but also has launch pads for
Sonda III and Sonda IV rockets. ("Brazil's Space
Program...", 1987, p. 77) The CLA was officially inaugurated
on 21 February 1990 by then-President Jose Sarney. The
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occasion was marked by the launching of a Sonda II, even
though the control center had yet to be completed. As of
December 1990, the VLS pad at Alcantara was projected to be
completed by 1993. ("Rocket Launched From...", 1991, p. 19)
The CLA facility is the closest launch facility to the
equator and has range clearance that allows launches from
equatorial to retrograde. It can place an object in an even
smaller geostationary transfer orbit than can the Ariane
facility at Kourou. Additionally, Alcantara provides the
advantage of fuel savings due to its proximity to the
equator and range safety. It is estimated that a launch
from Alcantara would require 25% less fuel than from Cape
Canaveral and that there would even be noticeable savings
compared with launches from Kourou. (Jane's, 1988, p. 489)
E. CONCLUSIONS
Examining some space fundamentals and launch facilities
shows that there is an economic rationale behind Brazil's
space program. Geosynchronous and sunsynchronous orbits are
the most commercially desirable orbits. The latitude and
range safety offered at Alcantara is similar, and even
better than that of Kourou, French Guiana. These properties
allow direct launches into geostationary transfer orbits at
a considerable fuel saving over Cape Canaveral. They also
allow for direct launches into retrograde orbits which must
be done from Vandenberg rather than Cape Canaveral
.
83
The ability of Brazil's Alcantara launch facility to
offer direct ascent into commercially desirable orbits and
operation of one, rather than two facilities makes the





Summarizing the analysis presented above returns the
reader to the purpose of the thesis which was to answer four
questions
:
(1) What are the critical technologies, facilities, and
processes required for a successful space program?
Clearly the critical technologies include liquid fuel
engine and TVC technologies. Liquid fuel engines deliver
more thrust and can lift payloads into orbit more
efficiently than can solid fuel systems. This allows larger
payloads, possibly multiple satellites on a bus, to be
placed into orbit. The Ariane IV and the U.S. Space Shuttle
are the main competition facing Brazil and both systems use
liquid fuel engines. Solid fuel technology is applicable in
some capacity for orbiting satellites, but liquid engines
are needed to economically compete in the space launch
market
.
However, solid fuel technology has significant
advantages over liquid fuel systems in ballistic missile
applications. Specifically, solid fuel missiles are easier
to hide, transport, and fire than are liquid fuel systems
like the Scud. These advantages make Brazil's solid fuel
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technology attractive to customers seeking ballistic
missiles
.
Additional technologies that are vital to both liquid
and solid fuel systems include composite materials for heat
shielding and reentry vehicles, pyrotechnics for stage
separation, heat treatment capability to strengthen motor
casings, and computer technology to help design engineers
and assist in on-board guidance.
Probably the most critical process required for a
successful space program is a strong national educational
system. There must be a constant source of educated,
literate, trainable citizens entering the workforce that can
build, operate, and maintain high technology space systems.
In the workplace, modern factories, management practices,
and quality control is a must to ensure near-zero defect
equipment for the space program.
(2) What technologies must be imported and which can be
indigenously produced? What critical industries are
typically absent in Third World nations which
inhibit progress in space?
Computer technology is the primary technology that must
be imported. The lack of advanced computers inhibits not
only design development, simulation, and testing in space
applications, but it also inhibits industrial efficiency and
manufacturing processes. This has a ripple effect
throughout the whole support structure for space industries.
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Computer technology is used in every facet of space
production from the control of precise milling machines that
produce missile hardware to the on-board guidance systems.
The lack of a sophisticated computer industry combined with
restricted access to First World computer technology is one
of the biggest inhibitors to progress in Brazil.
(3) What indicators would be present to show military
intentions and at what point would a military-
divergence take place?
The conclusion of chapter II generalized that the
presence of a strong military can predispose a civilian
space program to military purposes. This can certainly be
seen in Argentina, Iraq, Israel, etc. In many developing
nations the military wields enormous power domestically and
can often change the directions of programs from civilian to
military purposes. Regarding space programs, this would fit
the civilian-military pattern discussed in chapter II.
As in Brazil's case, "Security and Development" is a
common theme among other Third World military leaders.
Again it is possible to quickly point to countries like
Argentina, Iraq, Israel, South Africa, and many others that
are pursuing industrial modernization by emphasizing their
arms industries. Although it is not clear at what point
that a military divergence would occur, it seems that the
patterns discussed above, civilian-military projects and
"security and Development" would indicate that Third World
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nations such as Brazil with a strong military and a
developing space program are likely to use the cover of
their open space program to divert technology and resources
covert military projects.
(4) Can generalizations be formed which accurately
depict the military potential of another nations'
space program?
This is the most important and most difficult question
of all. The difficulty lies in the variables that inhibit
and/or promote each nation's space program. The
generalizations concluded from chapters II and III and
mentioned in the previous question seem to demonstrate the
potential of a civilian space program being subverted into a
military program, but they give no feel for the degree of
co-option. Variables such as level of industrial
development, national and global economics, success of the
MTCR, access to technology, education level of the
population, robustness of the industrial base, militarism of
society, geopolitics, openness of society, national
character, etc. help determine the degree of military
potential of a developing nation's space program.
As for Brazil, it seems clear that it has decided to
proceed with both space and missile programs for the time
being. Brazil's economic situation will be the prime
determinant in its military potential in space. A poor
domestic economy combined with a resurgent demand for
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missiles may leave Brazil little choice but to build and
sell missiles to keep its space program viable and to keep a
positive trade balance. A poor domestic economy combined
with a waning demand for missiles will most likely dry up
Brazil's missile programs. If this is the case, then Brazil
will be pushed towards conforming to MTCR guidelines
concerning weapons systems and technology transfers. In
this way, Brazil will try to join the First World space club
and modernize its VLS system and compete in the commercial
launch market. A strong domestic economy with a weak demand
for missiles may keep missile projects in the research and
development phase while the VLS will get much needed funds.
And finally, a strong economy and a strong demand for
missiles will keep both space and missile programs active.
The most likely scenario is a weak economy and a weak demand
for missiles. This would also be the best scenario from a
U.S. security standpoint. It is therefore in the interest
of the United States to try to lower the international
demand for missiles.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The generalizations produced through this single case
study should show a relationship between the strong presence
of the military in a developing nation and a tendency for
civilian space programs to be developed first, and then
diverted covertly to missile projects. There should be a
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relationship between military governments and "Security and
Development" programs that emphasize strong, robust defense
industries
.
Further research could validate or invalidate these
generalizations and quantify the degree to which military
potential exists in developing nations' space programs.
This would best be done by using a comparative case study of
developing nations with space and missile programs.
Variables such as economic development, civil-military
relations, regional threats, industrial capacity, GDP, etc.
could be quantified, scaled, and tested for statistical
significance. This type of approach, building on the
generalizations formed here, could find significant
relationships that will add predictability and a measurement
of degree to the question of military potential in
developing nations' space programs.
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